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A content analysis of social media users’ reaction to
religious disinformation in Bangladesh

Abstract
The present study seeks to explore social media users’ reactions to religious disinformation in
Bangladesh. Public comments were collected from the relevant Facebook posts related to an
online religious disinformation that took place in April 2019 and analyzed following a
qualitative content analysis method. The three key findings of this research are: (a) Social
media users react to disinformation more emotionally than reasonably; (b) more users show
diverse forms of destructive reactions when they encounter disinformation; and (c) although
more users have strong reasoning skills, only a few users show constructive reactions after
encountering disinformation. These results indicate the presence of hate spin that tend to
marginalize religious minorities in both social media and society. This study has limitations
related to the data analysis and generalization problem of the findings. The research findings
would help both academics to understand the multifaceted online religious disinformation and
users’ engagement with it, and policymakers to take effective measures to control interreligious
discontents.
Keywords: Religious disinformation; social media; fake news; reaction; qualitative content
analysis; Bangladesh.

1. Introduction
In March 2020, the Bangladesh government shut down all public institutions and assemblies
including mosques to prevent the spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Against
this official declaration, many Islamic clerics, popularly known as Mullah, Imam, Maulvi,
preached on Facebook and YouTube that the COVID-19 pandemic is a curse only for the
infidels, and the Muslims will be exempted from it (Rashid, 2020). This disinformation spread
across the country within a few hours. Believing such claims thousands of Muslims occupied
the street and protested the government’s decision. Such episodes of intentional rumoring and
rumor-mongering are taking place around the world irrespective of countries. Disinformation
is commonplace in human history, but social media disinformation is a novel phenomenon. Its
prime reason is the transformations in the communication system and the benefits that digital
media are offering to the people. Consequently, the internet-based media is thriving with its
multimodal communication, and traditional media is struggling to survive (Hong, 2012; Lysak
et al., 2012; Stassen, 2010): Bangladesh is no exception to this (Fahad, 2014; Mohabat, 2019).
The country has 30 million social media users in 2020, which is almost 22% of the total
population (Kemp, 2020), and Facebook is the most used social media platform with 94% of

the total social media users (Social Media, 2019). The political impact of Facebook in
Bangladesh is also remarkable. Recent sociopolitical movements, such as the Shahbag
movement in 2013, No-vat on Education movement in 2015, the Quota Reform movement, and
the Road Safety movement in 2018, were solely based on Facebook (see Ahmed, 2018;
Rahman, 2018). In these cases, social media outshined traditional media, demonstrating its
rising power and impact in Bangladesh society.
Disinformation has also gained new momentum worldwide in recent years thanks to the
growing popularity of social media. Incidents of disinformation-led-violence is commonplace
in South Asian countries as well. However, unlike the rest of the world, most of the
disinformation is intertwined with religion. For example, after 2015, India has experienced
more than a hundred mob lynchings caused by social media disinformation (Banaji et al.,
2019). Banaji et al. (2019) suggest that mounting sociopolitical crises, strategic discrimination
against the minorities (mostly against the Muslims), and nourishing the deep-rooted
socioreligious superstitions are the main causes of the proliferating social media disinformation
and violence in India. The state-sponsored hate campaigns against the Muslim minorities
bolsters the gau-rakshaks (“cow protectors” or “cow vigilantes”), who leverage WhatsApp
disinformation to terrorize and lynch the Muslims (Mukherjee, 2020). In Myanmar, Facebook
with 99.4% of the country’s total social media users has become an ideal instrument of
disinformation for the Buddhist nationalists mainly against the Muslim population and the
Rohingya minorities (The Economist, 2020). Bangladesh’s scenario is almost identical (AlZaman, 2019). Around 152 million people of the country are Muslims, which is 90.39% of the
total population, meaning most of the netizens are Muslims as well. Recently, the country has
become a fertile land of religious disinformation and disinformation-led violence (Bay, 2018).
The incidents of online communal disinformation, such as Ramu violence in 2012, Comilla
and Pabna violence in 2013, Nasirnagar attack in 2016, Thakurpara attack in 2017, and Bhola
violence in 2019, are becoming commonplace, disturbing the social peace and interreligious
harmony (see Al-Zaman, 2019; Haque, 2019; Minar & Naher, 2018; Alif & Rahman, 2019). It
is to note that social media does not implant the seeds of violence in a society. Rather, the
ideology of violence is rooted in society, and social media assists it (Arun, 2015).
Although episodes of online religious disinformation are ample in Bangladesh, the
academic endeavor has failed to properly identify its extent, its impacts on society, and its
differences from ordinary rumors. For example, disinformation-led communal violence is
addressed as just a rumor-incident (Minar & Naher, 2018). Disinformation is often addressed
as a sub-category of fake news as well (Haque, 2019). It hints that disinformation is yet to be
considered as a separate concept in academic discourse in Bangladesh. Considering its
relevance and importance, the present research aims to understand how social media users
interact with religious disinformation, emphasizing their online reactions (i.e., the language
they use). The analysis mainly focuses on users’ behavioral expressions through language in
discourse.

2. The Concept of Disinformation

2

The definition of disinformation is a contending issue in both philosophy and communication
studies. The PHEME Project defines disinformation as a type of rumor, along with
misinformation, speculation, and controversy (Derczynski et al., 2015). While misinformation
is an honest mistake, disinformation is nothing but misleading information that is intended to
deceive people (Fallis, 2014).
Disinformation has three main characteristics: (a) disinformation springs up when the
information process is defective (Floridi, 1996); (b) misinformation turns into disinformation
when its source is aware of its falsehood (Floridi, 2005) and (c) disinformation is purposefully
conveyed to mislead (Floridi, 2011). The last characteristic makes disinformation more similar
to lying (Fallis, 2011). Also, Fetzer (2004a) suggests that disinformation is nothing but lying.
Fallis (2014) on the other hand postulates that lying and disinforming may not always be the
same things as lying without disinforming is very much possible. Rather, he emphasizes the
intention to deceive others as the most basic indicator of disinformation. Besides, he
acknowledges that lying is the most notable type of disinformation. (Fallis, 2014). Fallis (2014,
2015) again comments that it is possible for disinformation to become true, i.e., true
disinformation. It seems that he emphasizes two things: (a) disinformation is always misleading
and intentional, and (b) disinformation and lying are not always positively correlated with each
other. The first proposition indicates that the source of disinformation produces it intentionally
and disinformation guide the public in the wrong direction. The second proposition indicates
that disinformation does not always convey the wrong information to guide the public in the
wrong direction, and thus, disinformation and lying would be different at some points.
However, if we take the idea of Floridi (2011) for granted that information must be true, then
disinformation, which is anything but information according to Dretske (1981), might not have
truth value: thus, disinformation should be false information. It contradicts the idea of true
disinformation.
Fallis (2014) categorizes disinformation into three types: visual disinformation, true
disinformation, and side effect disinformation. Referring to Fetzer (2004b), he also states that
“unlike lying, disinformation does not have to be a statement” (138), such as visual
disinformation (e.g., doctored photographs and videos). However, his concept of statement
seems narrow since a statement may incorporate not only written or spoken language but also
visual language, such as photos and videos. To better understand disinformation, we should
focus on an important question: why people believe disinformation? It leads us to the idea that
disinformation is a persuasive story.
Individuals communicate with others through stories (Fisher, 1987). A compelling story is
an easier way to convince people and make sense of an event. To be convincing and sensible,
a story should have rhetorical virtues: ethos, logos, and pathos (Aristotle, 1991).
Disinformation often takes the camouflage of persuasive stories to persuade its targets.
However, Difonzo & Bordia (2006) argues that urban legend is more connected to storytelling,
while disinformation is more to ambiguous or threatening situations. This view seems
incomplete. In Bangladesh, for example, almost every disinformation is accompanied by a
compelling story (Al-Zaman, 2019, 2020b). Disinformation stories are intended to guide
individuals to alter their viewpoints and engage in different actions.
Disinformation as a story may shift individuals from a rational-world paradigm to a
narrative-world paradigm (Griffin, 2011). The rational-world paradigm primarily considers
3

humans as essentially rational, who make decisions based on the arguments. On the contrary,
the narrative-world paradigm addresses people as essentially storytellers, who make decisions
based on (good) reasons (Fisher, 1985). Unlike the rational-world view, the narrative-world
view, which may include disinformation, sees the world as a set of stories (Griffin, 2011):
emotion plays an important role in stories. The persuasiveness of disinformation is thus based
on the coherence and apparent fidelity of its story, and the emotional appeal it can make. Also,
individuals tend to accept stories that match his/her prior set of beliefs and values (Jameson,
2001). Therefore, the criterion of a successful disinformation is that it should be a compelling
and carefully constructed story that is somehow related to public belief and values. Important
to note that rumor, misinformation, disinformation, and fake news are used interchangeably in
scholarly writings (Duffy et al., 2019; Jr et al., 2018; Muigai, 2019; Tandoc et al., 2020; Wardle
& Derakhshan, 2017). In recent years, besides information, social media has become a good
source of disinformation as well. Increased consumption of unverified information from
various social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, makes the users more
susceptible to disinformation (Newman, 2011; Newman et al., 2013; Shearer & Gottfried,
2017; Turcotte et al., 2015).

3. Social Media Users’ Reaction to Disinformation
How individuals perceive and respond to disinformation? In the rumor transmission theory,
Buckner (1965) identifies three positions that individuals take after encountering
disinformation. The critical set suggests that some individuals have more intelligence and
experience so they can evaluate information, identify deceptive facts, and exclude that before
transmitting it to others. In the uncritical set, individuals do the opposite mainly due to their
self-interest, lack of knowledge, and/or experience regarding the information. In the
transmission set, however, an individual’s critical ability is thought to be irrelevant as s/he only
transmit disinformation to others. The nature of transmission and response to disinformation
thus depend on which set the individual takes (Roeckelein, 2006). Transmission of
disinformation usually follows two different patterns. First, disinformation is transmitted from
individual to individual serially in a series of single interactions: it is called chain transmission.
Second, in the network transmission, many individuals get disinformation from a single source
(Buckner, 1965). In the digital age, network transmission of disinformation becomes more
commonplace thanks to the growing popularity of online communication and digital
information consumption. Therefore, understanding users’ online communication behavior is
imperative.
Several researches explored how people react to misinformation, disinformation, and fake
news. Mookherjee (2019) categorized public reactions to misinformation into three broad
types: affective, cognitive, and behavioral. Affective reaction deals with what misinformation
causes to people’s feelings, and cognitive reaction deals with the idea that “exposure to
misinformation does not only affect our emotions but it also affects our cognition and style of
thinking” (Mookherjee, 2019, p. 15). In contrast, behavioral reaction indicates that
misinformation changes our behavioral patterns and how we act: it may prompt undesirable
behavior as well, such as aggressiveness and avoidance.
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Like the present study, a few previous studies also dealt with the behavioral aspect of
people’s reaction to disinformation. For example, Grande-Allen et al. (2020) observed that
people usually do four things when they encounter fake news on online platforms: “Some
outright ignored it, some took it at face value, some investigated whether it was true, and some
were suspicious of it but then chose to ignore it.” In another similar study, Tandoc et al. (2020)
explored that most social media users either ignore or offer no corrections to disinformation
unless it is strongly relevant to themselves and/or people they are related to. In most cases,
users are largely incapable to distinguish information and disinformation and transmit it. Its
reason could be that the novelty in misinformation attracts users more often, so they likely to
transmit misinformation twice more than true information (as cited in Mookherjee, 2019).
Similarly, Verdizada (2017) shows social media content with false information gets more
attention from the users than the true information. Kumar et al. (2016) shows the human
capability of detecting disinformation is weaker than an automated classifier. Like the findings
of Tandoc et al. (2020) and Kumar et al. (2016), this study also hints at users’ less capability
of identifying disinformation. On the other hand, Altay et al. (2020) inferred that very few
people share misinformation as it may hurt their reputation. However, this inference fails to
distinguish between knowingly and unknowingly sharing.
Although these studies focused on users’ misinformation sharing behavior, none of them
discusses their analytical skills, reasoning capabilities, and/or emotional expressions. Why
some users believe disinformation and some do not? This may be because of their unequal
reasoning skills. Reasoning skills are based on three basic components: “the available
information, the cognitive information brought to bear, and generated inference” (Kurtz et al.,
1999, p. 145). That means, the users with strong reasoning skills would present relevant
information, operationalize their cognition, and make an inference, whereas users with weak
reasoning skills are possibly unable to perform one or more of these actions.
Why some users react constructively to disinformation while some react destructively? One
reason for this could be the difference in emotional attachment to the disinformation: the more
the users are attached to disinformation emotionally, the more intense their behavior could be.
That means disinformation about sensitive issues and issues of public interests in a particular
society may generate more intense and wide reactions. Arun (2015) and Mukherjee (2020)
show WhatsApp disinformation incites aggressive behavior among its believers. However,
their studies do not present the definitions and characteristics of aggressive behavior and the
description of users’ immediate (verbal) reactions to online disinformation. Aggressive
behavior is nothing but destructive behavior. It has two broader forms: indication of hostility
and verbal aggressiveness (Littlejohn & Foss, 2009). Hostility includes “irritability, negativity,
resentment, and suspicion” and verbal aggressiveness includes “character attacks, competence
attacks, ridicule, teasing, profanity, attacks on physical appearance, threats, malediction,
background attack, and non-verbal behavior, that is raising the middle finger, sticking out the
tongue, rolling the eyes” (Infante & Rancer, 1996; Infante & Wigley, 1986; Littlejohn & Foss,
2009, p. 46). Social media users display manifold destructive behavior (Bekiari & Pachi, 2017)
due to four primary reasons: psychopathology, disdain for other, social learning of aggression,
and deficiency in argumentative skills (Littlejohn & Foss, 2009, pp. 46–47). We have already
seen that destructive behavior led by social media disinformation (e.g., offline violence and
lynching) is commonplace in contemporary South Asia (Al-Zaman, 2020a, 2019, 2020b; Arun,
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2015; Banaji et al., 2019; Mukherjee, 2020). It is important to mention that constructive
reactions are more related to strong reasoning skills and destructive reactions are more related
to weak reasoning skills, although they often overlap.
As we see, previous literature inadequately deals with disinformation from the aspect of
users: what are the patterns of users’ language, and what it hints about their attitude towards
disinformation. Also, religious disinformation occupies little space in previous studies. As a
result, it is still unknown how social media users react to religious disinformation. Therefore,
this study attempts to answer the following question:
RQ: How do social media users react to religious disinformation?

4. Methods
4.1. Case selection
This study dealt with a prominent case of social media disinformation. The incident took place
on 4 April 2019 in Narail, a southwestern district of Bangladesh. A Hindu man named
Rajkumar allegedly defamed the Prophet (PBUH) in a Facebook post. However, like many
previous incidents, this one was also a disinformation to humiliate a Hindu man. A day before
the incident, Robiul Ahmid, a local mullah wrote on his Facebook profile: “Do you want to
harass any Hindu man? Open a Facebook ID using his name and photo, then you defame Islam
from that fake ID making him a scapegoat. Afterward, beat him heavily.” Ariful Islam, another
local mullah commented on the post: “I did the same thing once to ostracize a Hindu infidel.
Now, I am going to apply the same therapy against Rajkumar very soon.” This conversation
suggests that Ariful Islam produced the disinformation to humiliate Rajkumar. Without proper
verification, this disinformation was widely reported and shared on Facebook. It caused an
immediate online outcry that led to an offline crowd, demanding brutal punishment of the
accused. This incident of disinformation was selected purposefully due to three reasons. One,
it is a well-known disinformation that has strong and explicit evidence (e.g., screenshots of the
conversation and Facebook IDs of the mullahs), unlike the previous disinformation incidents
like Ramu violence and Nasirnagar attack (see Al-Zaman, 2019). Two, originating in social
media, this disinformation had offline impacts, i.e., demonstrations. Three, a few national
media outlets reported this social media disinformation considering its importance and impacts.
4.2. Sources and collection of data
I collected the data from Facebook, the dominant social media platform in Bangladesh. Total
seven Facebook pages: Daily Kaler Kantho, Daily Janakantho, Islam-er Dawat, Islami Chhatra
Shibir, Narail-er Alo, and Mufti Abul Kalam Azad Bashar Supporters Group posted seven
contents related to this incident. Of these contents, four were videos and three were text-based
reports: Each of their information was biased toward the disinformation and none of them
disclosed the true information publicly. As this research is designed to analyze users’ verbal
reactions to the disinformation so only the public comments were analyzed, excluding the
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Facebook Reactions (i.e., like, love, wow, care, sad, haha, angry). The seven selected Facebook
posts earned 1,339 comments between 4 April to 7 April 2019. At first, I extracted all the
comments from the public posts using Netvizz, a widely-used Facebook data extractor (Rieder,
2013), and compiled them in a CSV file. The whole corpus contained raw/unfiltered data, and
I randomly selected 457 comments from the corpus, which was 34.13% of the total comments.
I excluded the links, stickers, photos, and emoticons from the sample due to their irrelevance
to the research question. The final sample was 437. The unit of analysis of this study was the
comments. Random sampling is the most reliable sampling for media content, according to
Krippendorff (2013). He further suggests that for sampling texts in content analysis, the sample
should be more related to the research question than to the accurate representation of the
population. From both points of view, the sample was reliable.
4.3. Data analysis and coding technique
After selecting the sample, I coded the data. Two basic types of coding are (a) manifest coding
based on selected keywords and phrases, and (b) latent or semantic coding based on semantic
themes (Neuman, 2014). Each has its limitations. Therefore, both were applied to code the data.
Qualitative analysis requires inductive coding (Given, 2008), while deductive coding is more
appropriate for quantitative data (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). The coding was done manually in
Microsoft Office Word and Excel. An intra/interrater reliability test is difficult for a single
coder. In such a condition, one way is to repeat the coding in two different times (Time 1 and
Time 2) to determine the reliability of the codes (Mackey & Gass, 2005). Following this
technique, I coded the data, and the Krippendorff’s Alpha value of intra-coder reliability was
found substantial. Two notes are important here: (a) While analyzing the data, the religions of
the users were listed as well, based on either their Facebook profile name or information from
the profile; and (b) for a better understanding of the findings, translated quotes from the dataset
were used in some places.

5. Findings
The two themes emerged from the dataset: emotion-driven reactions and reason-based
reactions. The first one suggests that users’ reaction to disinformation is mainly emotiondriven, while the second one shows that in many cases, users react to disinformation based on
reason than emotion. I found 445 instances in the dataset in favor of the themes. Of those,
emotion-driven reaction had 276 (62.02%) instances and reason-based reaction had 169
(37.98%) instances. The percentages show that users’ emotional reactions are more palpable
than their reasoning ability.
5.1. Emotion-driven reactions
While social media users react to disinformation and interact with other users, they express
their emotions in various forms that can be categorized into two types: destructive reactions
and constructive reactions.
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5.1.1. Destructive reaction
A total of 256 instances of destructive reactions are found in the dataset that constitute 92.75%
of emotion-driven reactions. Destructive reaction primarily includes four specific expressions:
hatred, extreme anger, moderate anger, and frustration. Hatred is the most common destructive
reaction that includes vile language, anti-Hindu and anti-Muslim sentiment, demand for brutal
punishment, threatening, and xenophobia. Most of the vile language targets the accused as well
as the whole Hindu community for “undermining” Islam. In a very few cases, Muslims and
Islam are attacked verbally. Some popular words and phrases used frequently to admonish the
accused man are kuttar baccha (son of a bitch), khankir pola (son of a whore), motherchod
(motherfucker), malaun (accursed), and jaroj (bastard). For example, “Bring that motherfucker
[the accused] and let us bury him.” With this disinformation, anti-religious sentiments also
flourish. Many Muslim users who ostensibly consider the four major religions (i.e., Hinduism,
Judaism, Buddhism, and Christianity) as rivals engage in demeaning them. A very small
number of users criticize Islam.
Anger is another common destructive reaction. The language used in such comments hint
at the degree of users’ anger. Instances of both extreme and moderate anger are observed in the
dataset. I address extreme anger when a comment contains intense expressions, such as fasi
dao (hang him), shirocched koro (behead him), khun koro (kill him): “Hang him in an open
place.” Besides, moderate anger contains expressions that are not too intense, such as bichar
chai (we demand justice), upojukto shashti chai (we demand proper punishment).
Frustration also comes out when users react to disinformation. Their frustrations are mainly
related to the law that often lets the individual unpunished who commits blasphemy. According
to a user: “Ah! What Muslim state it is where we Muslims need to protest and demand
punishment of the infidels.” For some, Bangladesh society is becoming unfavorable for the
minorities due to intensifying Muslim-domination, and for others, it is becoming a Hindu-state.
Another group is disappointed with the eroding brotherhood among Muslims. They also
suspect that the failure of Muslim brotherhood is the main reason for the alleged Hindurevivalism in contemporary Bangladesh.
5.1.2. Constructive reaction
Compared to destructive reactions, instances of constructive expressions are relatively scarce
in the dataset (n=20, 7.25% of expression-driven reaction). Constructive reactions express the
words of benevolence, peace, and congruence. It includes two sets of instances. One, users
spread the virtues of Islam and Hinduism against the reported disinformation. Two, users urge
others not to exemplify this single reported event to generate communal disharmony, rather to
take social peace and accord into account. One user commented:
“Bangladesh is a secular country. Therefore, we are living here together, even
having different religious faiths. But some criminals take advantage of this in
the name of religion and suppress other religions. Being a Muslim does not
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mean that you should rebuke other believers. We never should do it irrespective
of religion. We should not hurt others’ beliefs, and I learn it from Islam.”
Notice that the standpoint of this user is seemingly obscure, but his words express the idea of
coexistence. Thus, some users want to bridge the gap between races, religions, and ethnicities
through their words. Constructive expressions in this sense are the stark opposite of the
destructive expressions.
5.2. Reason-based reactions
Compared to users’ emotion-driven reactions, the evidences of their reason-based engagement
with disinformation are relatively lower. It primarily indicates the users’ lower ability to act
reasonably than emotionally. Two types of users are discerned based on their reasoning skills:
users with strong reasoning skills and users with weak reasoning skills.
5.2.1. Strong reasoning
The analyses imply that strong reasoning ability is present among many social media users. In
support of this statement, 133 instances of strong reasoning skills are found that is 78.70% of
reason-based reactions. It primarily indicates that a decent portion of the social media users
possesses strong reasoning skills who use constructive language as well. Nevertheless, it does
not hint about how these skills are used: against or in favor of the disinformation. In the dataset,
I find several users can draw an analogy and inference, can reason critically, and can mock to
express denial subtly.
In the first place, many users frequently use analogical inferences while arguing in their
comments: Users who explicitly disapprove and who seemingly support the claims of
disinformation use analogies and inferences to prove their points. In such comments, the users
who disapprove of the disinformation mainly refer to three analogies. First, the present incident
is identical to many other disinformation incidents. Previously, such disinformation was
produced by Muslim perpetrators to trap the Hindus and Buddhists. Second, the geopolitical
ambience of the sub-continent is hostile. They hypothesize that the anti-Hindu sentiment in
Bangladesh could be a result of the anti-Muslim sentiment in India. Third, Muslims have a
real-life gain if they can evict Hindus from their lands. It mainly refers to the Enemy Property
Act 1968. A user commented:
“This time, it is the conspiracy against the Hindus of Narail. It is nothing but an
imitation of the Nasirnagar tragedy: no one condemned those people who were
behind the scene. But the Hindus had to suffer without committing any crime,
had to endure the assault of thousands of beasts [sic]. The state is silent too on
this issue.”
Notice that this statement refers to a man-made crisis that ravaged the Hindu community in
Nasirnagar in 2016. This comment, in one way, tries to justify that the present event is
disinformation and, in another way, accuses the state and the public for supporting and
digesting the disinformation silently. Many users similarly claim that the present
disinformation is intended only to perish the Hindu minorities.
9

On the other hand, (quasi-)supporters of the disinformation infer in some other ways,
mainly referring to the blasphemy laws of other countries that set extreme punishment for the
guilty. They also try to indicate that the Hindus are much tolerated in Bangladesh, unlike in
India where Muslims are tortured repeatedly and hacked to death. One user stated: “I think
Hindus are quite safe in our Muslim country [Bangladesh]. See the condition of Muslims in
India and India-controlled Kashmir.” This statement covertly supports the disinformation but
with more vague reasoning compared to the previous group of users.
Some users also take satirical and anti-fanatic stances in their comments. While the satirical
stance tends to deny the opposite view, the anti-fanatic stance tends to reject the communal
attitude. Most of the satires implicitly refuse the statement of disinformation along with the
statements of those who believe the disinformation. One satire is: “Oh my God! How Rajkumar
[the accused] earned so much power to defame the Prophet (PBUH)?” [Sic] This statement
expresses the user’s wonder and disbelief regarding the disinformation. The question mark in
the last sentence implies that no one might have that power to defame the Prophet, so people
should not unnecessarily display their irrational destructive reactions.
5.2.2. Weak reasoning
The dataset contains only 36 instances of users’ weak reasoning skills, which is 21.30% of the
reason-based reaction. The huge gap between the strong and weak analytical skills of social
media users is a somewhat positive sign. It might infer that most users have strong reasoning
skills, which means they try to reasonably evaluate the disinformation to some extent. Four
groups of users have weak reasoning skills: (i) they promptly believe the disinformation
without any analysis; (ii) they express doubt about the disinformation; (iii) they try to show
some reasoning skills, but fail and end up making no inference or conclusion; (iv) they demean
others to establish their viewpoints without presenting any reasonable arguments. First, these
users promptly believe and take the disinformation for granted because of their lower analytical
ability. They are more susceptible to disinformation. Second, some users do not take any side
as they are uncertain about the provided information whether it is true or false. It is because
they do not how to evaluate/examine the (dis)information. Therefore, they find it comfortable
to be in a doubtful position. They either vaguely pose questions or request others not to take a
stand before verifying the information. One doubtful comment is: “It could be a fake ID, so we
should not go for any action at first. We often involve wrongdoing because of our excitement.”
As we see, standpoints of such statements are not clear: do such comments support or deny the
disinformation? Third, some users attempt to use reasons but fail to reach to any conclusion
due to their incompetence in reasoning. They tend to use sober language and demands some
actions vaguely based on unsubstantiated reasons. Fourth, the lack of reasoning skills provokes
some users to demean others to promote their views. For example: “It [the disinformation] is
nothing but the act of hypocrite mullahs.” These comments contain instances of weak
reasoning. The commenters fail to draw appropriate analogies, inferences, and arguments to
support their claims. Thus, their comments, either in favor or against the disinformation, do not
help much to explain the disinformation.
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6. Discussion and Conclusion
6.1. Objectives and key findings
This study aimed to find out how social media users react to religious disinformation.
Following a quantitative content analysis, the findings show several propensities, but probably
the most interesting one is that most users react to disinformation emotionally than reasonably.
Previous studies on social media disinformation take only a few factors into account: impacts
of disinformation in politics (Broersma & Graham, 2012, 2013; Faris et al., 2017; Posetti &
Matthews, 2018); how social media users respond to fake news (Tandoc et al., 2020); online
disinformation in enabling communalism (Al-Zaman, 2019); disinformation sharing behavior
(Altay et al., 2020; Mookherjee, 2019; Verdizada, 2017); and typology of disinformation
(Buckner, 1965; Haque, 2019; Jr et al., 2018). We may also see that most of these researches
are impact studies.
The present study produces three novel findings. First, social media users’ reactions to
religious disinformation can be understood by two different but slightly intersecting sets of
reactions: emotion-driven reaction and reason-based reaction. While most users react
emotionally to disinformation, some users use their reasoning skills to support or demystify it.
It suggests that religious disinformation to many users is like persuasive stories. Historically,
storytelling enriches Bangladeshi society and culture, and the emotional appeal of religious
stories is not new in the country: from literature to folklore to public discussion, religious
stories are everywhere, as well as popular (Chandan et al., 2017; Uddin, 2006). For this reason,
it is possible that social media users perceive religious disinformation as a story, and react to it
emotionally. Also, their emotional and trust level suggest that religious disinformation matches
their prior beliefs (Buckner, 1965; Jameson, 2001; Roeckelein, 2006), that is, Hindus or
Buddhists or Jews could endanger Islam. Emotional attachment to the topic of disinformation
also plays a pivotal role here. This could be a reason that religion as a sensitive and interesting
issue in Bangladeshi society generates more intense and emotion-driven reactions among social
media users. The new wave of Islamic revivalism (Islam & Islam, 2018) could also be
responsible for this tendency.
Second, more users show diverse forms of destructive reactions when they interact with
disinformation, which includes hatred, anger, frustration, use of vile language, racial and
xenophobic expressions, threat and humiliation, teasing, and malediction. In short, users show
hostility and verbal aggressiveness (Infante & Rancer, 1996; Infante & Wigley, 1986;
Littlejohn & Foss, 2009) when they encounter online religious disinformation: though it is a
common behavior of social media users (Bekiari & Pachi, 2017). Previous studies (Littlejohn
& Foss, 2009) show that such behaviors could have four reasons: psychopathology, disdain for
others, social learning of aggression, and deficiency in argumentative skills. The findings show
that some users have lack of argumentative skills, and many have disdain for others. However,
this study cannot confirm that if the users’ destructive behavior is a resultant of
psychopathology and social learning of aggression. Instead, from the hate speeches and
offense-talking observed in the dataset, the techniques of religious disinformation and its public
reactions suggest the presence of hate spin, a systematic process of cornering the minorities in
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both virtual and real space (George, 2017). We have already discussed with examples that how
online communal disinformation leads to unwelcoming offline consequences in India,
Myanmar, and Bangladesh. Recently, Bangladesh has become the top country in persecuting
religious minorities (Hasnat, 2017), and after 30 years no Hindu will be left in the country if
the persecution persists, research suggests (Hasan, 2016). Now more studies should pay
attention to the offline impacts of online communal disinformation over religious minorities in
Bangladesh.
Third, although more users have strong reasoning skills, only a few of them show
constructive reactions after encountering disinformation. Possession of strong reason skills is
one of the users’ positive traits, though it does not indicate the users’ capability to demystify
disinformation. Rather, it suggests that more users are capable of evaluating disinformation,
choosing a position, drawing analogies and inferences, and presenting evidence and arguments
in support of their positions (Kurtz et al., 1999). However, it is not clear that how many users
believe disinformation and argue in favor of that. But the findings hint that the users who deny
disinformation have more constructive reasoning capability than the users who believe
disinformation. The findings also suggest that many users believe disinformation, which may
support the findings of Kumar et al. (2016), Verdizada (2017), and Tandoc et al. (2020). Its
reason could be, as mentioned earlier, that disinformation as a story satisfies the prior belief
and interest of the users, convincing them to believe it: In this case, such users are uncritical or
have weak reasoning skills (Buckner, 1965; Jameson, 2001).
Overall, the results show some positive and negative tendencies of social media users’
reactions to disinformation. Users’ intense destructive reactions mostly against the religious
minorities may create religious disharmony in both social media and physical society, throwing
them into a spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). On the contrary, the constructive
reaction is useful for congruence among religious communities, although its instances are
limited. Further, users’ strong reasoning skills indicate a positive tendency, while weak
reasoning skills hint at their cognitive deficiency. There is a possibility that the users with weak
reasoning skills may work as a transmitter of disinformation (Buckner, 1965). What is more
pressing is that more users tend to react emotionally than reasonably to online disinformation:
Emotional users can easily be deceived by the distorted facts of disinformation.
6.2. Limitations and significance
This study has some limitations. First, it mainly focuses on Bangladesh so the result may not
be generalized for other countries. Second, weighing Facebook reactions should include not
only users’ comments but also their emojis, so the textual data (i.e., users’ comments) used in
this study may not reflect the overall picture. Third, the sample size of this study was relatively
smaller than the previous studies on disinformation (e.g., Tandoc et al., 2020). Apart from these
limitations, this study has a contribution in the field of internet research. First, it bridges two
important fields of research: religious studies and online communication. Also, although online
religious disinformation is a pressing issue in Bangladesh, little research has been done so far:
the analysis of Facebook comments in the Bangla language is unique in the research arena as
well. Therefore, this study would inspire and guide more researchers. Finally, the analysis of
social media data using a qualitative content analysis method is relatively novel in the field of
12

social science and humanities in Bangladesh. Therefore, the present study would be a good
addition to the stream of digital research methodology. To forecast its academic and policy
value, this study would help academics to understand the important aspects of users’ reaction
to religious disinformation to consider in future studies. Also, religious intolerance in
Bangladesh is mushrooming along with social media communication. Therefore, for better
decision-making and protective measures, policymakers need to understand how social media
users interact with religious disinformation.
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